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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 22 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

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General debate (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

The PRESIDENT said that Algeria and the United Arab Emirates had requested the Secretary-General of the Conference to grant them Observer status. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved that request.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT said that nominations for the posts of Vice-President for the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States had been submitted by Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Mexico, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved those nominations.

It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

Mrs. von GRUNIGEN (Switzerland) noted with satisfaction that new States had acceded to the Treaty since 1985 and that the number of participants in the Review Conferences was steadily growing. In particular, she welcomed the presence for the first time of observers for the two nuclear-weapon Powers that were not yet parties to the Treaty, namely, the People's Republic of China and France. It was hoped that they would accede to the Treaty rapidly.

Since 1985, the situation had evolved positively in certain regions of the world, especially owing to the unprecedented improvement in East-West relations, which had reduced the risk of nuclear war and was making it possible to negotiate important arms control agreements. Détente had also brought about rapid political changes in several European countries, which was also helping to decrease the risk of armed conflict. Nevertheless, although positive that evolution involved certain dangers. First of all, certain States that no longer enjoyed the protection of a nuclear-weapon Power might well be tempted to acquire their own nuclear defence capability. New international security systems should be developed to provide for such a possibility. Second, the opening-up of the markets of the Eastern European countries and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should not have the effect of diminishing interest in the countries of the third world, whose needs for assistance remained the same and whose situation, as shown by recent events, remained precarious. The international non-proliferation system should therefore be adapted to a changing international situation, and the Treaty might possibly be supplemented by other instruments.

Regarding the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, her delegation welcomed the substantial progress made in recent years by the two super-Powers in the area of arms reduction, especially in Europe. The signing of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in December 1987 represented unprecedented progress in the area of arms control, since the Treaty provided for genuine reduction of both States' potential nuclear capabilities, together with an entirely new verification system, which might serve as a precedent for the elimination of other military imbalances. However, the INF Treaty should be followed by other agreements on conventional and chemical weapons. It seemed that an agreement on conventional forces in Europe might be concluded before the next Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Her delegation hoped that the negotiations on a reduction of strategic nuclear weapons would produce a new agreement in 1990, and, like most States, it considered that the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban was essential for guaranteeing compliance with the commitments made under article VI of the Treaty.

Her delegation also welcomed the signature by the two super-Powers of the verification protocols, which had enabled the United States Senate to ratify the two bilateral treaties of the 1970s on the limitation of nuclear testing. It also felt that the Conference on Disarmament could play a useful role in negotiating an instrument on a nuclear test ban, which was why it was participating actively in the work of the Conference.

It was important to avoid a situation where certain States, in view of the lack of formal guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States, would come to the conclusion that they could ensure their security only by creating a nuclear force. It was true that the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon Powers provided some guarantees, but they did not have the weight of a treaty. On the other hand, a multilateral treaty might give rise to reservations by certain parties, which was why the negative security assurances proposal seemed to have been made at an appropriate time. However, that proposal raised some technical problems since it presupposed the conclusion of a multilateral agreement linked to the Treaty, while the Conference was not empowered to negotiate such an instrument.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could play a positive role in the process of reducing military arsenals, from both the psychological and political points of view. However, given the great mobility and range of the vectors, the establishment of such zones did not necessarily offer absolute safeguards at the military level.

Although the information received indicated that the provisions of article I of the Treaty had not been violated, it must be acknowledged that new dangers were threatening the effectiveness of the current system. For the first time, States parties to the Treaty had reportedly attempted secretly to obtain equipment that could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, which was all the more disturbing because one of the States in question had already employed other weapons of mass destruction, was in possession of missiles with a considerable range and had not hesitated to attack neighbouring countries. The proliferation of missiles, which was a new development, was therefore particularly dangerous in the case of States possessing weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the fact that certain parties to the Treaty had not concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA within the stipulated time was particularly alarming, especially when the States in question were using nuclear facilities that were not subject to control and making their signature conditional on demands for which the Treaty made no provision.

Her delegation welcomed the fact that three non-party States, namely, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa, had apparently abandoned any intention of pursuing their military nuclear programmes, and it hoped that those countries would rapidly become parties to the Treaty. It had the same hope with regard to Israel, India and Pakistan, whose uncontrolled nuclear facilities continued to be a source of very serious concern to the international community as a whole.

With regard to article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, the fact that even a depositary State had recenty delivered major nuclear facilities to a State that was not a party to the Treaty without requiring those facilities to be placed under the control of the Agency proved that unanimous agreement did not exist on the question of safeguards. A policy of refusal to deliver nuclear material or restrictions on its delivery might in certain cases lead the States concerned to take the path of uncontrolled autarky. Switzerland, for its part, had not recently had to take a decision on such a delivery to a

non-nuclear-weapon State that was not a party to the Treaty. However, if such a case were to arise, it might consider requiring all nuclear facilities in the receiving country to be placed under international safeguards.

The system of safeguards under IAEA control had proved to be effective for the past 20 years or so, but it seemed that the Agency, whose budget was also subject to the zero-growth principle, would not be able to cope with its increasingly heavy inspection work-load in future. Since few countries were prepared to increase their financial contribution to that sector of the Agency's activities, it might be useful to consider a different conception of the system itself, without calling into question the effectiveness and credibility of the non-proliferation régime. The Conference might look into that question of principle, while respecting the Agency's decision-making autonomy in that area.

Concerning article IV of the Treaty, she said that the Swiss Government intended to keep the nuclear option open so that Switzerland could have access to an adequate energy supply as well as for ecological reasons. Since the political, economic and social impact of the accident at the Chernobyl power station had raised doubts about the future of the nuclear option, international co-operation on the technological safety of nuclear facilities was more necessary than ever. In addition, since the costs of a new nuclear programme had become prohibitive for most of the developing countries, it had to be acknowledged that, for a large number of States, the exercise of the rights set forth in article IV remained theoretical.

The basic objectives of the Treaty had always given rise to animated discussion, namely, whether priority should be given to the elimination of nuclear weapons, the promotion of the development of nuclear energy in the countries of the third world or action to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In her delegation's opinion, the Treaty, signed by each of the parties in the interest of a common cause, should be considered as a whole, the goal being to attain all the objectives it set forth. In the long term, however, purely technical measures such as the implementation of IAEA safeguards were not sufficient to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and all States would have to show all the political will necessary to work towards that goal. In fact, many States now openly recognized that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would threaten their own security and thus that it was in their own interest to respect the provisions of the Treaty.

Finally, in her delegation's opinion, it was not for the Fourth Review Conference to look into the question of extending the Treaty in 1995, for in conformity with article X of the Treaty, extension would be considered at a special conference to be held in 1995. The organization of that conference might be entrusted to a preparatory committee that could meet in 1993.

Mr. WALDEGRAVE (United Kingdom) noted that the Conference was taking place at a time when the divisions between East and West were dissolving, but when there were great tensions in other areas of the world, especially in the Gulf. The illegal annexation of Kuwait was putting the whole fabric of law to the test. In that connection, his delegation associated itself with the remarks made by the Italian delegation about the treatment of innocent civilians, including a large number of United Kingdom citizens.

Since 1986, the last four States that had signed but not ratified the Treaty had finally deposited their instruments of ratification, and five more States - Malawi, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar - had acceded. His delegation also welcomed the fact that the two nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the Treaty, China and France, were attending the Conference for the first time as observers.

The assurance which the Treaty gave enhanced the security of all the States parties and of the whole world, but the threat of poliferation remained very real, which was why all States should be called on to accede to the Treaty as the principal international instrument in that area. The Treaty also constituted an important foundation for the international system of safeguards operated by IAEA, which made possible the peaceful use of atomic energy, in conformity with article IV. In that connection his delegation did not believe that a distinction should be made between the Agency's promotional and safeguarding activities; it fully acknowledged the importance of the Agency's role in both areas. The United Kingdom, for its part, had steadily been increasing its contribution to the Agency's Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund as well as its financial contribution to the projects specifically aimed at helping NPT developing member States.

Turning to the question of compliance with the obligations incumbent on States parties to the Treaty, he said that the nuclear-weapon States had a special obligation to ensure that they did not in any way, even inadvertently, contribute to the development of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear-weapon State. In that connection, the United Kingdom continued to work together

with other nuclear supplier States to define exactly what was entailed by the obligations contained in article III and was scrupulous in complying with export regulations in that area.

He acknowledged that the United Kingdom did discriminate: in favour of parties to the Treaty and in favour of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. His country was prepared to join a consensus of other major suppliers to insist on full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Nuclear-weapon States were not required by the Treaty to accept safeguards on their civil nuclear activities. However, it was recognized that some safeguarding was desirable, and the Third Review Conference had recommended the universal application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities. Although his delegation had some hesitation about the priority that should be given to that question, he wished to make it clear that the United Kingdom reported fully to IAEA on all civil nuclear material and authorized the Agency to designate for inspection any civil nuclear installation on the country's facilities list. All United Kingdom civil nuclear activities were inspected by EURATOM.

Concerning the implementation of article VI, he welcomed the progress made since 1985. East-West tensions had been reduced, and the threat of global nuclear war had receded. At the previous month's NATO summit meeting in London, the member States had proposed to the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a joint declaration solemnly stating that they were no longer adversaries and reaffirming their intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. With regard to nuclear disarmament, he congratulated the United States and the Soviet Union on the INF Treaty, which had come into force in 1988, and on the progress achieved in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. The two States had also reached agreement on verification protocols for the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. The United Kingdom would respect the new régime for nuclear testing established by those Treaties, but it would have to continue to conduct underground tests to ensure that its nuclear weapons remained effective and safe. A comprehensive test-ban treaty remained a long-term goal. The number of land-based nuclear warheads in Europe had also declined significantly as a result of NATO's unilateral withdrawal of some 2,400 weapons since 1979.

The Alliance had agreed that, shortly after the signature of an agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, negotiations should begin between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces. The Alliance had also proposed that, once those negotiations had begun, they should eliminate all nuclear artillery shells in Europe in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union. That having been said, the ultimate objective of article VI was a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. There, too, some satisfactory results had been recorded. The period since 1985 had seen agreement on a series of far-reaching measures to promote confidence and stability in Europe and rapid progress towards the reduction of conventional forces, and there had been progress towards a global ban on the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. The United Kingdom had played an important role in the negotiations in those areas and would continue to do so, and it called on all the States represented at the Conference to join it in working to promote the further easing of tensions, the strengthening of trust and international peace and security.

Regarding the implementation of the Treaty by other States parties, he said his delegation was extremely concerned. It noted, first of all, that a considerable number of States parties to the Treaty had not fulfilled their obligation under article III, paragraph 4, to negotiate a safeguards agreement with IAEA. Some of those States had significant nuclear facilities on their territory. For example, North Korea had deposited its instrument of accession in December 1985 and had still not concluded a safeguards agreement. There were other States which had concluded safeguards agreements but whose behaviour gave cause for concern. There was also the question of clandestine procurement. Clandestine procurement of sensitive items inevitably aroused suspicions about the intentions of the States concerned. To combat such activities, exports of nuclear products must be monitored. Moreover, under article 73 of its Statute, the Agency could propose additional inspections, and under article 77 it could obtain access to information or locations in addition to that specified in the agreement. Finally, under article 19, if the Board of Governors found that the Agency was unable to verify that nuclear material was indeed being used for peaceful purposes, it could take a number of steps described in the Agency's Statute. Those provisions might be used if there were grounds for suspicion that any State party to the Treaty was accumulating unsafeguarded nuclear material.

If all States parties could pledge to comply with their obligations and guard against any actions that were contrary to the Treaty, they would be contributing to the maintenance and strengthening of the Treaty. As for States not parties to the Treaty, the United Kingdom urged them to accede to it. It addressed that call particularly to India and Pakistan, Israel and South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, all States that had significant unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. It also invited all the other non-parties to accede to the Treaty.

Finally, he asked delegations to keep two goals in mind: first, to concentrate on the real tasks of the Conference, and second, to send a signal to the world that the Treaty was in good sh[illegible] and that all the States parties supported its noble objectives.

Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia) said that the Fourth Review Conference of the parties to the NPT provided an opportunity for a sober assessment of the Treaty's implementation. His delegation hoped that the Conference, which was taking place in an atmosphere characterized by improved relations in various regions of the world and the progress made by the United States and the Soviet Union in the area of reduction of nuclear weapons, would become a landmark on the road to the total cessation of the nuclear arms race, horizontal as well as vertical. The Treaty would be credible only if its three cardinal principles, namely, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, were respected. His delegation hoped that the Review Conference would furnish an opportunity of enhancing that credibility.

Turning to an evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty, he said that the three nuclear-weapon States parties had observed the provisions of article I but had not been able fully to implement the provisions of the eighth to eleventh preambular paragraphs and article VI. Since the Treaty's entry into force, progress towards halting the nuclear arms race and vertical proliferation had been meagre. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, for their part, had fully discharged their obligations under article II. Indonesia believed that the factors that had led to the inability of States parties fully to implement the Treaty's provisions should be reviewed regularly to enhance its credibility. The United States and the Soviet Union had concluded agreements aimed at halting the arms race, but that was insufficient. His delegation was of the view that the most decisive

measure to halt the nuclear arms race was a total ban on nuclear testing. Moreover, under the provisions of article VI, all parties had undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and on nuclear disarmament, as well as on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Thus the Treaty should not be considered merely as an instrument to encourage negotiations on nuclear and non-nuclear arms control. Indonesia was also worried by the fact that the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons was being accompanied by improvements in the quality, accuracy and reliability of nuclear weapon systems. With regard to nuclear disarmament, an assessment of the position also revealed a certain degree of dissatisfaction. It was true that the INF Treaty had initiated a reduction in nuclear arsenals. However, even a 30 per cent reduction of the strategic nuclear weaponry of the United States and the Soviet Union would still leave them with arsenals far exceeding those they had had in 1970, which was contrary to the spirit of article VI of the Treaty.

Turning to the implementation of article III, he noted with satisfaction that the IAEA safeguards system had effectively served the goal of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the system had been operating under the principle of a "zero growth" budget, and Indonesia believed that that might jeopardize its effectiveness. It was only just that the contributions of the nuclear-weapon States or the most advanced nuclear States should continuously be increased and that the Agency should not use budgetary restrictions as a pretext to lessen safeguard coverage. The Government of Indonesia was also concerned by the growing demands of the heavily safeguarded industrial countries to limit the safeguards system operating in their nuclear facilities. Any relaxation of present standards would seriously erode the effectiveness of the system. Placing the civilian nuclear facilities of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States on an equal footing would certainly help to encourage transparency, which was a crucial element in the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that connection, during the mid-1980s nuclear-weapon States had voluntarily submitted their civilian nuclear facilities to the safeguards system. But that was insufficient: the system should be in operation in all civilian nuclear facilities and fuel cycles in all countries.

Since the last Review Conference, efforts had been made and concrete measures taken to implement article IV, and particularly paragraph 2. However, there was much more to be done if the developing countries parties to the Treaty were fully to enjoy all its benefits. It should be noted that, instead of facilitating the fullest exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, some States parties continued to give assistance in the nuclear field to States that were not parties, thus applying discriminatory policies against the non-nuclear-weapon developing States parties to the Treaty. The implementation of article IV in the last few years had been affected to a great extent by the world-wide slow-down in the growth of civilian nuclear power owing to environmental, safety and economic factors. In addition, after a series of serious nuclear accidents, efforts had been made to maximize safety in nuclear power plants. Since the cost of modern nuclear power plants with new safety features was very high, many developing countries encountered problems in financing them. For that reason, he fully supported the statement made by the representative of the non-aligned and neutral States which called upon States parties that were in a position to do so to expand their assistance through IAEA and to promote favourable financing by international institutions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Regarding the implementation of article VII, Indonesia had always emphasized the importance of the regional approach to peace and security, in particular through the establishment of zones of peace or nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Indonesian Government believed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, based on decisions freely arrived at by the States of the region, would promote peace, stability and security in the areas concerned and curb the spread of nuclear weapons. At their summit meeting in December 1987, the ASEAN States had emphasized that ASEAN should intensify its efforts aimed at the early establishment of south-east Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. Despite the strong determination of the countries in the region, the ASEAN nations had encountered insurmountable obstacles. His delegation therefore repeated its earnest call to all parties to support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia.

The question of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States that had undertaken to renounce nuclear weapons had always been one of the central issues in the debates on non-proliferation. The resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-fourth session also indicated the urgency of having an international instrument to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Indonesia was convinced that the most effective way to protect the non-nuclear-weapon States was the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States should give an unconditional guarantee not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States were one of the incentives nuclear-weapon States could provide in exchange for the commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States not to produce, acquire or possess nuclear weapons. Indonesia supported a number of concrete proposals tabled during the preparations for the Conference.

The Fourth Review Conference was a crucial one. In view of the 1995 Conference, it could not afford to fail. It should therefore reaffirm the need to enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty, and the parties should reaffirm their commitment to its purposes; but that was not sufficient. The Conference must spell out the measures to be taken, particularly by the parties that had not implemented the provisions of the Treaty. Indonesia would continue to demand a comprehensive test ban, nuclear disarmament and assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used or held out as threats against non-nuclear countries. Indonesia also requested that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be accorded greater assistance in the development of their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Mr. GENSCHER (Federal Republic of Germany) said it was gratifying that representatives of the international community were gathered at Geneva for the fourth time to review the 1968 NPT. The fact that the number of participating countries, member States and observers had grown was a sign of the continuing confidence in the Treaty. The NPT had proved to be a corner-stone of international stability and had performed its function of fostering international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, proving that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were fully compatible with the goal of non-proliferation. In that connection, the European Council, meeting at Dublin, and the economic summit at Houston had emphasized the need

to make every effort to contribute to strengthening non-proliferation and encouraging the participation of further countries. The Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, had expressed its unconditional support for all initiatives aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It had undertaken to contribute actively to the successful outcome of the Fourth Review Conference and had appealed to all countries to make joint efforts to avert the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation.

Considerable progress had been made in the five years since the last Review Conference in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament. A new political setting had emerged in recent years, characterized by the following: Europe was at a turning-point in history; the elimination of ideological confrontation had paved the way for eliminating military confrontation and reducing military arsenals; parallel to reductions of armaments, new co-operative security structures were emerging; and German unification was proving to be a pace-maker for the coalescence of Europe. Democracy and a social market economy, co-operation and an awareness of interdependence characterized the new Europe as it headed for a pan-European peaceful order.

The NPT was a central instrument for the maintenance of international peace, and the Federal Republic of Germany therefore advocated the long-term extension of the Treaty beyond 1995. It had consistently pursued an effective policy of non-proliferation and the comprehensive renunciation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus it had renounced nuclear weapons on acceding to the Western European Union in 1954, introduced a system of extensive controls for the use of nuclear energy in the European Atomic Energy Community founded in 1957, joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957 and acceded to the NPT in 1975, thus confirming at a global level its renunciation of nuclear weapons.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany strongly supported the IAEA safeguards system and made every effort to increase their effectiveness. Strict compliance with the international nuclear suppliers group guidelines was an essential element of German non-proliferation policy. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had adopted more stringent foreign trade regulations to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and encourage international co-operation in the civilian use of nuclear energy. Above all, i at meant that exports of nuclear goods to non-NPT countries would in principle be authorized only if those countries subjected all source and

special fissionable materials to IAEA full-scope safeguards. In addition, it had been decided to codify principles of German nuclear export policy that were already being observed. Efforts to prevent the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must not overlook missile technology. The Federal Government strongly supported all activities designed to make the missile technology control régime established in 1987 more effective. It called upon all countries to do the same.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany took export controls very seriously, despite the fact that military exports had accounted for only 0.2 per cent of the Federal Republic's total exports in 1989, and it had adopted some very severe and restrictive export control measures to avert the danger of proliferation of militarily-usable technology and to prevent illegal arms exports. However, the best contribution to nulcear non-proliferation was accession by all countries to the NPT, and the Federal Republic therefore appealed once more to all countries that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty.

He welcomed regional efforts to prevent the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such efforts were an important contribution to maintaining regional stability - the Tlatelolco Treaty being a good example.

As long as the nuclear-weapon States had not fulfilled their obligations under the Treaty, the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States for guarantees against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons remained legitimate. The strengthening of negative security assurances could have a positive impact on the universality of the Treaty.

The NPT was not intended merely to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States. It combined the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the commitment to disarmament and arms control. Since its accession to the Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany had emphasized the commitment to nuclear disarmament contained in article VI, and it had strengthened its commitment since the last Review Conference. It had accordingly played a significant part in bringing about the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, which provided for the world-wide elimination of an entire category of weapons, and it had strongly supported the START negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which aimed at reducing their strategic nuclear weapon systems. It welcomed the negotiations on confidence-building and security measures and the Geneva negotiations on defensive and space weapons.

Further nuclear disarmament was necessary and indeed possible. The changed security situation in Europe would permit less and less reliance on nuclear weapons for the purpose of preventing war. In that connection, he mentioned the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons, which would be started soon after the signing of an agreement on conventional forces in Europe. The signing of the verification protocols to the threshold Treaties at the United States-Soviet summit in Washington would constitute a further stage along the road to a ban on nuclear tests.

The Federal Republic of Germany advocated agreement on an effectively verifiable nuclear test ban as soon as possible within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. It also advocated a step-by-step approach to that goal, like that taken by the United States and the Soviet Union in their negotiations on nuclear test matters. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Federal Republic of Germany focused on developing, together with other countries, reliable verification procedures for nuclear explosions. It welcomed the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The Conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty, scheduled for January 1991, reflected the serious endeavour of many countries to achieve faster progress on that question.

The NPT applied not only to nuclear disarmament but to all kinds of weapons. All military equipment must be reduced. That was the goal of the arms control negotiations taking place in Vienna. The negotiations on conventional forces in Europe were aimed at establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels and at eliminating the capability for launching surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive action. That goal, which was now within reach, would establish a qualitatively new basis for peace and security in Europe by the end of 1990 and oblige participating countries to destroy thousands of tanks, artillery pieces and other military equipment.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany regarded the reallocation of arms resources to peaceful purposes as a major new international challenge. That question had recently been the subject of a United Nations Conference in Moscow. The aim was to limit the arms production potential and at the same time to create capacity for industrial development that would benefit all countries.

Further progress in arms control was needed, not only in Europe but also world-wide, and weapons exports to third world countries should be reduced. The third world must not become a dump for weapons no longer needed in Europe. The proliferation of chemical weapons in those countries would be particularly tragic. The conclusion of a world-wide, comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons was long overdue. Only a convention of that nature, containing effective verification rules, could reliably and lastingly prevent the spread of such weapons. The events of the past few weeks had made it clear that there was an urgent need for world-wide agreement on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, as solemly reaffirmed by the vast majority of the international community at the Paris Conference in January 1989. The United States and the Soviet Union had already reached an agreement to stop the production of chemical weapons. Like its Western partners, the Federal Republic of Germany had stated that it intended to be one of the original signatories of the world-wide chemical weapons convention and appealed to all countries to do the same.

The international community was experiencing a period of new opportunities and new challenges, for the East-West conflict was now a thing of the past. The new development of the relationship between the two super-Powers made the peace-keeping missions of the United Nations ever more effective, as illustrated by the successful efforts made in southern Africa and Central America. However, the positive changes in Europe and other regions did not automatically lead to world peace. Iraq's aggression had confronted the world and hence the United Nations with a new crucial test. The United Nations had demonstrated its firmness on that question by adopting various resolutions which very clearly indicated that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait constituted a breach of international peace and security. Iraq must withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally. As long as it refused to do so, it was essential for all countries jointly to implement the economic sanctions adopted by the Security Council in its resolution 661. Every effort must be made to contribute to a peaceful solution on the basis of the Security Council resolutions.

More than ever before the world must seek peaceful solutions to its conflicts. The Charter of the United Nations and the institution of confidence-building measures were essential components of the peace process.

Soon there would be only one German State. That development illustrated the end of the cold war and of the antagonism and political rivalry that had divided East and West for over 40 years. After the achievement of unity, the German nation would face the task of eliminating the consequences of long-standing divisions in the political, economic and social spheres. But unification would also stimulate the united Germany to devote even greater efforts to global problems whose solution no longer brooked any delay. It would also make every effort to achieve the unity of Europe as a whole.

The united Germany's commitment to deep cuts in its forces would serve as an example of how swords were turned into ploughshares. Disarmament and arms control policy would be a central element of the peace policy pursued by a united Germany. In that spirit, the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic had decided to make a joint declaration before the representatives of the international community.

The two Governments reaffirmed their contractual and unilateral undertaking not to manufacture, possess or have control over nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. They declared that the united Germany, too, would abide by that obligation. Rights and obligations under the instruments of the NPT would continue to apply to the United Germany, which would seek the continued validity of the Treaty beyond 1995. At the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the united Germany would strive for a comprehensive, world-wide and verifiable ban on chemical weapons at the earliest possible date, and it intended to be one of the original signatories of the convention.

The international community was at a particularly critical but promising threshold in the final decade of the second millennium. It must be crossed jointly with a firm dedication to peaceful co-operation and international solidarity. The participants in the Conference were called upon to conduct joint efforts to enhance the authority and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. DOMKE (German Democratic Republic) referred to the joint declaration of the Governments of the two German States on the renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons which showed that the two Governments were agreed that the united Germany would act in a constructive spirit for comprehensive disarmament and for the promotion of international peace. It would be appropriate for those principles of renunciation to become embodied in the future Constitution of the united Germany, and he noted that the recent

talks between President Gorbachev and Federal Chancellor Kohl had reaffirmed the hope that a nuclear-weapon-free territory would emerge in the very place where the highest density of nuclear weapons was still to be found.

The recent changes in the German Democratic Republic, German unification and the democratization of Eastern Europe had paved the way for pan-European security and co-operation structures. The positive developments that had taken place in Europe and in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States offered an unprecedented opportunity to reduce nuclear arsenals and to meet the obligations incumbent on States possessing nuclear weapons under article VI of the NPT. That would make peace more secure and considerably strengthen the non-proliferation régime for nuclear weapons.

The events taking place in the Middle East showed how fragile peace was. It would take efforts on all sides to settle that conflict, which illustrated once again the crucial importance of the NPT. In that context, there was an urgent need for the world-wide prohibition of chemical weapons.

The NPT made an important contribution to both universal and regional security. It promoted both international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear arms limitation and disarmament. Although non-proliferation had come to be an established norm of international law, the Treaty was by no means perfect. However, he appealed to all delegations to leave aside the Treaty's weaknesses to seek consensus on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It was encouraging to note that further States had acceded to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference and that China and France were attending the Conference as observers. He hoped that those and other States would consider acceding to the Treaty.

Looking back over the period under review, he said that the basic commitments contained in articles I and II of the Treaty had been observed. But times had changed and there was a need to strengthen existing international rules against the proliferation of those weapons. Efforts must be made to prevent the spread of ballistic means of delivery and of certain components for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

While the non-proliferation régime could hinder the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in the long run the question could be solved only by political means, by the cessation of the nuclear arms race and by nuclear disarmament. That relationship was reflected in article VI of the NPT and had

also inspired the joint non-proliferation statement made by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev at their Washington summit. The implementation of the INF Treaty, the envisaged signing of a START agreement between the United States and the USSR by the end of the year, and the beginning of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons were the next steps in the nuclear disarmament process. No nuclear-weapon State should remain aloof from that process.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban remained a matter of priority. The progress recently achieved in Soviet-American negotiations should be continued by further bilateral measures to reduce such tests quickly in number and yield. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament was a positive step. The Conference to amend the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 was an expression of the world-wide interest in the early cessation of all test explosions.

Regional measures such as nuclear-weapon-free zones effectively complemented the NPT. The Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga should therefore be followed by further agreements establishing such zones. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty rightly expected guarantees of their security. Renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons would enhance the security of those States. Major steps in that direction had been the unilateral statements of the USSR and China on the non-first use of nuclear weapons. The current review of the security concepts of the nuclear-weapon States and of the alliances opened up new prospects in that area.

The IAEA safeguards system was an essential guarantee for ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty. The IAEA's inspectorate was making an important contribution to the effective implementation of the NPT. Modern nuclear technologies made novel demands on safeguards. The German Democratic Republic was certain that the future Germany would support IAEA in the further development of its safeguards system. What was also needed was the conclusion of safeguards agreements between IAEA and the States parties to the NPT, in particular those with significant nuclear activities.

The experience gathered from the well-functioning system of verification constituted by IAEA safeguards should be taken into account in future arms limitation and disarmament accords, especially regarding the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The German Democratic Republic supported the proposal to separate military from civilian

nuclear activities in the nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, measures to control the export of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies continued to be of great importance. The German Democratic Republic endorsed the decisions recently taken by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan.

The NPT and its safeguards system had created the necessary basis of trust for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. IAEA, which had proved its competence, should continue to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in developing countries through its Technical Assistance and Co-operation Programme.

The German Democratic Republic, which had learned the lessons of Chernobyl, was convinced of the need for the renunciation of nuclear energy as the primary source of energy in the long-term future, and it used nuclear energy to produce only 10 per cent of the electric power it needed. The bulk of its energy was derived from lignite processing with all its ecologically harmful consequences. The 5.2 million tonnes of sulphur dioxide and 2.2 million tonnes of dust discharged into the atmosphere in his country annually explained why nuclear energy, in the short and medium term, would remain part and parcel of German energy policy until it was possible to reduce the environmentally harmful effects of conventional electric power generation. In the area of nuclear energy use, top priority was given to nuclear safety and radiation protection. The Government of the German Democratic Republic, supported by the Federal Republic and with the services of Soviet and French experts, had submitted all its power reactors in operation or under construction to a thorough safety evaluation, which had resulted in the shutting-down of some nuclear power reactors.

In conclusion, he recalled that, in the weeks to come, the Conference would have to set the course for the extension of the NPT in 1995. That would require co-operation from all sides, as Egypt had suggested in its proposal on an international dialogue on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference would best live up to the expectations placed in it if it adopted a comprehensive final document calling, in particular, for further nuclear arms limitation and disarmament measures, achieving the universality of the NPT, promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and strengthening the IAEA safeguards system. The Conference should not merely strengthen the Treaty but also make an important contribution to world-wide security.

Mr. PERPINA-ROBERT (Spain) said that the Conference was opening at a time when mankind, which had begun to believe in a new and hopeful way in peace, freedom and common ideals in many countries, had been harshly brought back to reality. Facing the spectre of war, injustice and violence, Spain wished to make a new appeal in favour of peace and international legality on the basis of strict compliance with recent Security Council resolutions on the current crisis. In that context, he associated himself with the statement made at the previous meeting by the Under-Secretary of State of Italy.

In becoming a signatory of the NPT on 5 November 1987, Spain had encapsuled in a legal framework the strict policy of nuclear non-proliferation that its Government, aware of its own security requirements and of the changes needed to ensure collective security in the world, had applied until then. A climate of trust among States must be created through the reformulation of doctrines and military strategies in order for them not to have war as their goal, but the avoidance of war. Coherent disarmament processes endowed with adequate verification mechanisms would allow for the creation of balances of forces at lower levels, on an unrelinquishable security threshold. The benefits of disarmament would be reflected in development and people's welfare, by which the disarmament-development-security trilogy would acquire its full significance.

Spain's current non-proliferation policy remained based on the NPT, which it continued to consider not as a point of arrival but as a corner-stone on which a safer world could be built, based on confidence, co-operation and mutual respect among all States, as Spain had declared on acceding to the Treaty.

At a time when the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were making rapid progress towards freedom and democracy, which would lead to the strengthening of peace and security, nuclear non-proliferation was a challenge to be met by all mankind. The gradual disappearance of East-West tensions had opened up new prospects for the nuclear non-proliferation policy and for disarmament.

The NPT was an essential instrument for achieving two indissociable objectives: the control of nuclear proliferation and the promotion of international co-operation. With regard to limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, national measures, whether bilateral or multilateral, of a technical, commercial or even military nature, were no substitute for the willing consent given by potential donors and recipients of nuclear

technology, based on the conviction that the proliferation and multiplication of nuclear weapons did not contribute to national security but had the opposite effect. For Spain, however, the promotion of international co-operation and technology transfer for peaceful uses of nuclear energy was just as vital in order for the Treaty to attain the necessary credibility and to be universally applied.

A system should be conceived at the Conference, as well as in other United Nations bodies, that respected countries' legitimate interests, so that those who so wished might have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Although it was not perfect, the NPT had served to achieve the purposes for which it had been devised. It should be mentioned that at the previous Review Conference, in 1985, 132 countries had renewed their support for the Treaty, thereby strengthening it politically. Since then, the accession of nine new member States, including Spain, had underscored its vitality and universal nature.

Although observance of the Treaty since 1985 could be deemed satisfactory, there were still important areas in which improvements must be made. In the past few years, and very recently, there had been serious cause for concern in territories where tensions had increased. Strict compliance with the safeguards provided for under article III of the Treaty was more necessary than ever, together with the signing by those States which had not yet done so of safeguard agreements with IAEA, as they had undertaken to do when they had entered into the Treaty.

In that connection, IAEA with its safeguards system was a major factor for non-proliferation and must play a leading role in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the same time, Spain attached enormous importance to IAEA's activities in the field of technical co-operation for peaceful purposes. Its role must therefore be strengthened and its efforts given maximum support by all countries.

The observance of articles IV and V of the Treaty was vital in order to attract new signatories and to strengthen the NPT's credibility with a view to extending it in 1995.

Spain also attached great importance to compliance with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty which was intended to put an end to the arms race and to advance towards nuclear disarmament. In that connection the Government of Spain welcomed the conclusion of the INF Treaty which for the first time in

history eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons, and it unreservedly supported the rapid conclusion of a START treaty, which would provide for the elimination of 50 per cent of the super-Powers' strategic nuclear weapons, as well as the agreement in principle recently concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union in that respect. He was convinced that the conclusion and implementation of the INF Treaty, the advances in the negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons and prospects for immediate negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons based in Europe would have a considerable impact on the work of the Conference.

Nuclear testing should gradually be reduced, with a view, when the time came, to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which were weapons of mass destruction par excellence. The international community appeared to be willing to move in that direction. The best ally of the disarmament process was a realistic, and therefore gradual, approach. If the necessary joint efforts were made to reduce nuclear weapons until they had been completely eliminated, a total ban on nuclear testing would be achieved as a matter of course. In that way transformation of the partial test-ban Treaty, which was a legitimate cause of concern for many countries, would be carried out.

Another pillar of Spain's non-proliferation policy was control of the technology likely to be used for the manufacture of missiles, especially those that could be fitted with nuclear warheads.

Recent regional conflicts that had taken place in different areas of the world, and the use in some cases of weapons of mass destruction with indiscriminate effects, had shown the need for the international community to take steps to prevent such things from happening again. Co-operating with a group of countries that had also expressed concern at the proliferation of missiles with multiple capacities, Spain had in 1989 joined the Missile Technology Control Régime (MTCR) set up in 1987 by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada. The régime, which did not hamper technology transfer for peaceful uses, was an irreplaceable instrument for preventing the proliferation of missiles. The Government of Spain was satisfied with the operation of those control mechanisms and hoped that a growing number of countries would join; in its view the MTCR was an adequate instrument for completing a rigorous nuclear non-proliferation policy.

Discussions would also focus on the problem of the renewal of the Treaty, which would be decided at the 1995 Conference. Neither article X nor any weighty reason whatsoever militated in favour of ending the NPT. In five years, when the States parties were called upon to decide how to extend the Treaty, a fresh review of the status of nuclear proliferation would probably reveal compelling reasons to extend an instrument whose usefulness had been amply demonstrated. A large number of organizational aspects would have to be taken into consideration at the present Conference and up to 1995, but that should be done without casting any doubt on the need for maintaining the Treaty in force. For the Government of Spain, 1995 would be the year not of the Treaty's expiry, but of its extension by the Conference for an indefinite period or for the longest possible period.

The survival of mankind depended on the rational use of the new force represented by nuclear energy, and its possible non-peaceful use was a grave concern for which the international community must find an adequate solution. The continuation of nuclear disarmament, improvement of the Treaty control mechanisms and safeguards and better systems of transfer and co-operation for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were reasons for which the Spanish Government would like to see the NPT not only maintained, but also strengthened and enlarged. The accession of new parties with a view to making the Treaty universal would be desirable. His delegation, for its part, would spare no effort to ensure the success of the Fourth Review Conference, which would also mean success for all peace-loving countries.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia), speaking on behalf of the non-aligned and other States parties to the NPT not taking part in the East European or Western groups, said that the NPT was a legally binding multilateral instrument that had confirmed the urgency of putting an end to the nuclear arms race. Its full implementation was an important step towards nuclear disarmament, world peace and regional security. Yet implementation was not an end in itself, since the aim of the Treaty was also to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The number of signatory countries had increased significantly since the Treaty's entry into force, and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had established an international norm of non-acquisition and non-possession of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty.

Recent political developments further underscored the importance of strict and faithful compliance with the NPT in its entirety. It had become evident that the enhancement of peace and international security could be achieved by political means and through the widest possible international co-operation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Attempts to justify nuclear deterrence and the nuclear arms race ran contrary to those positive developments and the spirit of the NPT.

Although they recognized the positive elements and effects brought about by recent agreements and ongoing negotiations in the nuclear disarmament field, the countries he represented regretted that the modernization and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons continued. Vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States continued contrary to the provisions of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty. As for horizontal proliferation, the spread of nuclear weapons capability among certain States not parties to the NPT posed a serious threat to the non-proliferation régime and underlined the gravity of the problem.

In the circumstances, the non-aligned and other States parties underlined the importance of the basic goals of and the commitments undertaken under the NPT towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, namely, to avert the danger of nuclear war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples; to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race by taking effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and hence to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear testing for all time by undertaking negotiations to that end without further delay; to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and, finally, to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and their vectors.

The possibility of a significant extension of the NPT would be enhanced by the effective implementation of the Treaty by 1995 and in particular that of the obligations relating to nuclear disarmament. Consequently, it was urgent to take the necessary steps to consolidate the effectiveness of the NPT by reaffirming its authority, and to ensure its universality and the

implementation of its provisions, especially by the depository States. Such steps included instituting an immediate moratorium on all nuclear testing, as a provisional measure pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty; fully supporting the PTBT amendment Conference and undertaking full-scope negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the Ad Hoc Committee established in 1990 by the Conference on Disarmament; starting negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on items 2 and 3 of its agenda with the active participation of all nuclear-weapon States; declaring an immediate moratorium on and an immediate cessation of production of weapons-grade fissionable material and, finally, beginning immediate negotiations within the context of the NPT with a view to the early conclusion of a legally binding multilateral instrument of guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament should be intensified with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In addition, the deployment of nuclear weapons in the non-nuclear-weapon States should be stopped and the nuclear weapons already deployed there withdrawn, existing agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones should be respected and regional efforts aimed at establishing such zones supported; negotiations with a view to the further reduction and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons and their vectors should be intensified, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States; the arms race in outer space should be prevented and immediate negotiations undertaken to that end and the commitment not to supply with nuclear-weapons-related material, technology and services the States not parties to the Treaty which had nuclear facilities not safeguarded by IAEA should be strictly respected.

For the non-aligned and other States parties to the Treaty, peaceful nuclear co-operation including technology transfer was a commitment laid down in article IV of the NPT, and they regretted the unsatisfactory realization of that commitment and the many unjustified restrictions and constraints imposed on developing non-nuclear-weapon States parties. They believed that those States parties that were in a position to do so should promote co-operation between States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; reaffirm their acceptance that all States parties were entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information and to contribute to the further

development of applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the right of all States parties to participate in it; enhance the role of IAEA and provide better assistance through IAEA to developing countries, and favourable financing by international institutions to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other nuclear technology applications. The States parties to the NPT should also provide adequate IAEA funding for both its assistance and safeguards functions. In addition, they should offer economic incentives to the developing countries parties to the NPT, not only in respect of nuclear energy but also other energy sources and accord special attention to the least developed countries. Finally, they should give priority to the NPT member developing countries in nuclear energy applications to food and agriculture, health, industry, physical and chemical sciences, nuclear safety, etc.

Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable right of all States parties to apply their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs.

Finally, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries.

Mr. MADHOUR (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of the United Kingdom had referred to the illegal annexation of Kuwait and certain aspects of the Gulf crisis. However, reflection on the events of recent days or even those of the past century led to the conclusion that the problems raised in the Gulf, as in other regions, were the result of British colonialism. The peoples that had suffered from it in the past were aware of the nature of the relations that the United Kingdom had allowed to persist in the colonial countries after having been forced to leave them when they became liberated. The United Kingdom's colonial history in Kuwait and its establishment of dispersed entities whose purpose was to continue to divide the region were primarily responsible for that situation. The United Kingdom was not a policeman responsible for restoring order and enforcing international law, which it persisted in violating daily by its

military presence in the Gulf. The embargo that had been imposed to starve the populations of those countries was in itself a breach of international law. The Gulf problem could only be solved after the withdrawal of United Kingdom and other foreign forces from the region; that course of action offered the sole possibility of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in those countries.

He also reminded the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany that the Security Council resolutions in question had been adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations and that their implementation in no way required the use of armed force. The military measures that had been taken had absolutely no justification under international law.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.